In his A Treatise of Freewill, Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are 'up to us' (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) and that these things are the product of our choice (προαίρεσις). These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim to be drawing on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias.
manuscripts containing material arguing against determinism, now all in The British Library. 4 Cudworth makes clear in his Preface that his original intention was simply to write 'a discourse concerning liberty and necessity' and in particular to write 'against the fatal necessity of all actions and events'. 5 Of his three philosophical enemies Cudworth held determinism to be the most dangerous because, by undermining the role of praise and blame, it makes 'a day of judgement ridiculous' and thereby destroys respect for God. 6 Cudworth opens The True Intellectual System by raising the problem of 'the necessity of all human actions and events' but soon moves on to tackle various forms of atheism, deferring his main task to the never-completed third part. atheism and determinism are inevitably intertwined. 8 However, Cudworth goes further and suggests that if these doctrines are traced back far enough we shall realize that all forms of atheism are mere corruptions of earlier forms of theism, and so he credits atomistic theism (of which Democritean atomistic atheism is a corruption) to one Mochus of Sidon. 9 We find the same methodological approach at work in Cudworth's A Treatise of Freewill, where he identifies the determinism of Hobbes as one of his principal targets but then traces the view back to antiquity, turning to Cicero's De fato for an account of the Stoic version of determinism. 10 What is striking about Cudworth's argument against Stoic determinism, however, is the way in which he explicitly claims to draw on Stoic doctrine for resources in his fight against the Stoics. Although the Stoics propose a pernicious form of thoroughgoing determinism they also, Cudworth suggests, acknowledge that rational beings are able to act freely. Cudworth writes 'according to that Stoical doctrine that the truest and greatest goods and evils of rational beings consist ἐν τοὶς προαιρετικοὶς or ἐν τοὶς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν [i.e.] in their own free willed actions or things in their own power'. 11 The Stoic concepts that Cudworth alludes to here, the ideas that some things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or 'up to us' and that these are in some way connected to our προαίρεσις or choice, play a central role in the philosophy of the late The aim of what follows is to examine this apparent turning of Stoics against Stoics in Cudworth's discussion of free will and determinism. The first section outlines the central project of A Treatise of Freewill and discusses Cudworth's objections to Stoic determinism. The second section examines the apparently Stoic terminology that Cudworth deploys in response to Stoic determinism, terminology that we find throughout the works of Epictetus. As we shall see, although this terminology is indeed central in Epictetus, the context in which he uses it is significantly different from the one in which Cudworth is working. The third and final section will suggest that, due to these differences, Cudworth cannot be using these concepts with the sense that Epictetus attaches to them.
Instead it will be suggested that the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias is a more likely source for Cudworth's resources in his battle against Stoic determinism.
Cudworth's Project in A Treatise of Freewill
Cudworth's project in A Treatise of Freewill is to argue against all forms of determinism and in favour of the claim that we possess a free will. In the opening chapter of the text he says that we have a natural instinct that leads us to believe that some things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or 'in our own power '. 12 This natural instinct is illustrated by the fact that we praise and blame the actions of others, on the presumption that those actions were freely chosen, and by the fact that we feel guilt when we don't act as well as we might, again presuming that those actions were freely chosen and so our own responsibility. We would not praise and blame and feel guilt, Cudworth claims, if human actions were necessary or determined. 13 14 We do not punish the animal that acts viciously, even though we might restrain it, but we do punish the human who acts viciously precisely because we hold that it was within their power to act other than they did. Christian doctrine also teaches that we are free in our actions, so both natural instinct and Scripture agree that some things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or within our own power. 15 The task of A Treatise of Freewill is to offer further illustrations of this fact and to undermine the arguments of those who deny it in favour of some form of determinism.
In the second chapter Cudworth identifies his principal targets, naming Hobbes but then quickly moving back to antiquity in order to locate earlier examples of determinism. 16 He quickly turns his attention to the Stoics, drawing as we have noted on Cicero, and it is then in the third chapter that Cudworth explicitly begins his argument against Stoic determinism. He begins by presenting their doctrine of cyclical recurrence, which posits periodic conflagrations of the world separating cycles of events, where each cycle is an exact and necessary repetition of the previous one, in which, as Cudworth puts it, 'there must be all along the same or like men, doing all the same things exactly'. 17 rule out the possibility of any human freedom of action but it also turns God into a 'necessary agent', unable to change any events from one cycle to the next. He writes, 'they supposing God Almighty himself to be a necessary agent too, and, therefore, that after the several conflagrations, he must needs put things in the very same posture he had before'. 18 Here Cudworth is drawing on the account of Celsus, recorded, and then attacked, by Origen in his Contra Celsum. 19 In responding to this Stoic doctrine Cudworth quotes at length from Origen's response to Celsus, 20 which is another important source of evidence for wider Stoic thinking about human action and determinism, insofar as it reports the Stoic response to the famous 'idle argument', 21 also recounted in Cicero. 22 We can note, then, that while writing A Treatise of Freewill Cudworth had to hand two important sources for Stoic views on the issues with which he was concerned. 23 Having introduced his enemies in the second and third chapters, Cudworth proceeds to offer a whole series of responses to the various arguments against free will in the subsequent sections of the text. I shall not go through all of these here but I shall note that towards the end of the text Cudworth returns again to Hobbes and the Stoics, addressing their shared claim that 'nothing can be without a cause, and whatsoever hath a cause 18 
Echoes of Epictetus
At first glance, then, Cudworth is explicitly arguing against Stoic determinism. However, the matter is complicated when we pay attention to the terminology that Cudworth uses to articulate his own alternative to the determinist position. As we have seen, Cudworth opens the first chapter of A Treatise of Freewill by claiming that it is by natural instinct that we have a sense that some things are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or 'in our own power'. 31 The phrase ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν has a long and complex history in ancient philosophy.
We find it used by Aristotle, by early Stoics such as Chrysippus, by late Stoics such as Epictetus, by Plotinus, and by a range of other late ancient authors grappling with issues related to human action. 32 These authors often use the phrase in quite different senses, so it is necessary to ask with which sense does Cudworth use the phrase. As we have seen, Cudworth suggests he is using the phrase in a Stoic sense. 33 completely under our control. 35 For instance, if I choose to go for a walk and I meet no obstacles then the walk that I take is 'up to me' (or we might more naturally say 'down to me') in the sense of it being my action caused by me, on the early Stoic view. 36 But for Epictetus walking is not one of the things 'up to us' because it is something that can always in principle be obstructed. 37 I have no absolute control over whether I can go for a walk when I want to due to a whole range of external factors that might stop me from doing so. Only those things that are so completely under my control that they can never be hindered are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or 'up to us' according to Epictetus. Ultimately the only thing that is up to me in this sense is my judgement, the choices and assents that I make, my use of impressions as he sometimes puts it. 38 By contrast my body and anything I might try to do in the physical world is not up to me due to the contingent obstacles that might intervene. 39 I have no control over my body because I have no control over my health or a whole range of other factors that might impede it, but I do have control over the judgements that I make and no external factors can ever force me to change my judgement against my will.
Epictetus' concern here is not Cudworth's metaphysical problem of free will, then, but rather a more practical concern with learning how to avoid frustration and disappointment. There are two points here that are worth underlining. The first point is that if Cudworth is using ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in a Stoic sense, as he claims, then he must be thinking of Epictetus, and not Chrysippus, given that he uses it to refer to human choice rather than causal responsibility. The second point concerns Cudworth's conjoining of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν with the notion of προαίρεσις or choice. As we have seen, Cudworth attributes to the Stoics the idea that 'the truest and greatest goods and evils of rational beings consist ἐν τοὶς προαιρετικοὶς or ἐν τοὶς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν [i.e.] in their own free willed actions or things in their own power'. 42 Now, ἐν τοὶς προαιρετικοὶς is a phrase that we find in Epictetus' Discourses, 43 and προαιρετικά is a term that Epictetus uses interchangeably with ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, 44 and these introduce the key Epictetean concept of προαίρεσις. 45 Epictetus uses this term to refer to our choice or volition, or even our self, for there is a sense in which for Epictetus our choice is all that is properly ours, for it is the only thing that 41 is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or within our control. 46 As before, this is a pragmatic ethical claim rather than a metaphysical one.
The notion that there might be some conceptual connection between the terms ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and προαίρεσις is not unique to Epictetus, however, as a connection between the two had been drawn by Aristotle, who defines προαίρεσις as 'the deliberate desire of things ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν'. 47 However it is worth noting that Epictetus and Aristotle conjoin the two notions in quite different ways. 48 When Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics that προαίρεσις is 'the deliberate desire of things ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν', 49 he is saying that our choice is a choice of things that are 'up to us'; we choose between actions that are within our power, for instance; whereas for Epictetus it is our faculty of choice itself that has become the only thing properly 'up to Enchiridion, he writes that 'illness is an impediment to the body, but not to one's προαίρεσις' and so illness is 'an impediment to something else, but to not yourself'. 52 For Epictetus, then, one's προαίρεσις is what we essentially are, and identified with what is 'up to us'. If I were trying to give a complete account of Epictetus' position here I would of course need to add various qualifications, 53 but the important point for our present purposes is that this is quite different from Aristotle's view. So we need to be aware that there are two distinct relations between these technical terms available. But in any case, Cudworth is not talking about Aristotle here; as we have seen, he is explicit that he is thinking of Stoic doctrine, and among the Stoics it is Epictetus who conjoins these two terms.
The first point we considered earlier shows that Cudworth uses ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in an Epictetean rather than Chrysippean sense; now this second point shows that he joins ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν with προαίρεσις in an Epictetean rather than Aristotelian way. Both points suggest that Cudworth uses the phrase ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν with the same sense given to it by Epictetus.
Alongside ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and προαίρεσις we find a third term with Stoic provenance in Cudworth and this is ἡγεμονικόν. Epictetus uses both προαίρεσις and ἡγεμονικόν regularly, although not quite synonymously. 54 In brief, the ἡγεμονικόν, which we might very loosely translate as mind, which is sometimes translated as 'governing principle', and which Christopher Gill has recently rendered as 'control-centre', 55 overlaps with one's προαίρεσις but it is broader, encompassing not only our choices but 52 Epictetus, Enchiridion 9 (same caveat). 53 For the sorts of qualifications needed see Sorabji, Self, ch. 10. also our impressions and impulses. 56 One of these parts of the ἡγεμονικόν, our capacity to receive impressions, is passive, in the sense that we do not have control over the content of our impressions, so they are not 'up to us' in the way that our προαίρεσις or choice is. So, there is a difference between these two concepts.
Cudworth introduces the term in Chapter 9, where he calls it 'the ruling, governing, commanding, determining principle in us', 57 rolling a variety of possible translations all into one. It is here, in this ruling principle, that we shall find what is 'up to us' Cudworth suggests, following an Epictetean understanding of 'up to us'. 58 Cudworth also suggests that this concept of the ἡγεμονικόν was explored by 'the Greek philosophers after Aristotle', 59 without being any more specific, although at this point he cites Origen as his immediate source. 60 But Cudworth's gloss on the passage, drawing on the sixteenth century Latin translation of Sigismundus Gelenius, indicates that he understood the term to refer to each person's reason (sua cuique ratio), a thoroughly rational principle which is the source of our good and bad actions; 61 in other words, he seems to have understood the term in broadly the same sense as the Stoics did.
In short, then, Cudworth's defence of free will is made using terminology that designates three key and closely-related concepts that we find in the 56 While there is explicit evidence that Cudworth was well aware that these were Stoic terms, there isn't any to confirm that he was taking them directly from Epictetus. 62 He may have drawn on later sources influenced by Epictetus, such as Origen or the Neoplatonists, and the Neoplatonists of course borrowed from Stoicism, using their resources within a philosophical system that opposes itself to Stoic materialism and determinism. 63 Cudworth was intimately familiar with the works of Plotinus and the subsequent Neoplatonists, and so it is possible that he may have taken the terms from any one of them. 64 However, as we have seen, Cudworth explicitly attributes this notion to the Stoics, and as a rule the Neoplatonists rarely acknowledged their borrowings from the Stoa, making a Neoplatonic source less likely.
Putting source questions to one side for the moment, what is striking here is the way in which Cudworth is deploying one set of Stoic concepts in opposition to another set, setting late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism we might say. We might say, but we would be wrong to do so. 62 However there is plenty of evidence that Cudworth was familiar with Epictetus' texts. Epictetus' Enchiridion or Handbook opens with a distinction between those things that are 'up to us' (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) and those that are not (οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν), and we know that Cudworth was familiar with this as he had a copy of the commentary on it written by the Neoplatonist Simplicius, which he cites in The reason why we would be wrong to do so is because, as I noted earlier, Epictetus' use of these key terms does not take place within the context of a discussion about the metaphysical problem of free will versus determinism. Epictetus' concern when he talks about our προαίρεσις and the fact that it is the only thing that is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν or 'up to us' is with what we might call a practical and pragmatic ethical issue about how to avoid frustration and disappointment in our lives. For if we make our happiness dependent upon the fulfilment of desires, the fulfilment of which is out of our control, then we are bound to find ourselves disappointed much of the time. But if we only desire those things that are ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν then we shall never be disappointed. Thus Epictetus' council is that our only object of concern should be our judgements, for these are the only things guaranteed to be within our control. This ethical advice says nothing about the question of whether our judgements are absolutely free from the influence of antecedent causes or whether they are necessarily determined by the state of our character, our existing beliefs, and so on. Epictetus doesn't really take a stand on the metaphysical question that exercises
Cudworth.
This raises a number of questions, most notably why is it that Epictetus seemingly has no interest in the metaphysical problem of free will, and why and how is it that, despite this, Cudworth seems to be using this Epictetean terminology in his discussion of the metaphysical problem, terminology that it now looks as if it might not be relevant to that debate.
In order to answer both of these questions (or at least to indicate where we might start to look for a answer) I want to bring into the discussion another ancient philosopher, one that Cudworth only mentions in passing in A Treatise of Freewill, namely the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. 65 As we shall see, a case can be made for the claim that it is Alexander, and not Epictetus, who stands behind Cudworth's turn to the notion of some things being 'up to us' (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν).
Echoes of Alexander of Aphrodisias
It has been argued that the origins of the modern metaphysical problem of free will versus determinism, the problem with which Cudworth is concerned, can be found in Alexander's De fato, written approximately a century after Epictetus flourished. 66 This is why Epictetus does not really address himself to the free will problem, because it did not exist for him in the way in which we understand it now. Although it is suggested that the foundations for the problem can be found in the De fato, Alexander's text is not itself explicitly about free will in the modern sense either. 67 71 See Alexander, De fato 181-2 (trans. Sharples, pp. 58-9), esp. 181,14: ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δι' ἡμῶν. In fact, it is not clear whether this is Alexander's gloss on the Stoic position or simply a report of something said by some real Stoic opponent. The same phrase can be found in Nemesius, De natura hominis 35 (106,10-13 Morani). 72 Alexander, De fato 181,13-14 (trans. Sharples, p. 58): ἀναιροῦντες γὰρ τὸ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς αἱρέσεώς τε καὶ πράξεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγουσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δι' ἡμῶν.
73 See e.g. A Treatise of Freewill, ch. 18, p. 197. or remitting and consequently of determining ourselves better or worse'. 74 For Cudworth, then, for something to be 'up to us' it has to be something actively within our power to have changed, rather than merely causally involving our participation. This is the other sense of the phrase that we find in Alexander's De fato and it appears to have been introduced by Alexander himself for the very first time. 75 Alexander claims simply to be following Aristotle, 76 Alexander's view with that of unnamed Scholastic philosophers. 78 Cudworth notes that Alexander is of the view that with 'the same things being circumstant, the same impressions being made upon men from without, all that they are passive to being the same, yet they may, notwithstanding, act differently'. 79 So here, Cudworth is following Alexander's understanding of this phrase ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, rather than Aristotle, Chrysippus, or Epictetus, for it is in Alexander that we seem for the first time to find this phrase with both the Epictetean shift to a concern with choice itself and a concern with being able to choose other than we do. 80 Epictetus' use of the phrase is neutral with regard to the metaphysical problem of free will but Alexander's is not. There are a number of other parallels between the two works that might add further weight to this suggestion. We have seen that in the opening chapter of A Treatise of Freewill Cudworth claims that our natural instincts lead us to praise and blame others for their choices and to feel guilt over some of our own choices. The fact that we are led by nature to do these things Cudworth takes to be strong evidence in support of the claim that is it possible for agents to act other than they do. The same point is made by
Alexander in Chapter 12 of De fato:
[…] how it is not absurd to say that this mistake [of assuming we do have the power to act otherwise] is one that all men in common have made by nature? For we assume that we have this power in actions, that we can choose the opposite, and not that everything which we choose has causes laid down beforehand, on account of which it is not possible for us not to choose it; this is sufficiently shown also by the regret that often occurs in relation to what has been chosen. For it is on the grounds that it was possible for us also not to have chosen and not to have done this that we feel regret and blame ourselves for our neglect of deliberation. But also when we see others not judging well about the things that they have to do, we reproach them too as going wrong. 81 As in Cudworth, the fact we all by nature praise and blame and regret is This is close to the definition of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν that Cudworth uses in the same chapter in which he also discusses praise and blame. He writes:
we are to conclude that there is something ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, in our own power, and that absolute necessity does not reign over all human actions, but that there is something of contingent liberty in them. 83 I am not arguing for a close textual parallel here but nevertheless it is striking that this use of the ubiquity of praise, blame, and guilt to argue for the existence of the ability to choose otherwise should appear in both works, in addition to the terminological parallels that have already been It is quite possible, of course, that Cudworth was simply drawing on subsequent discussions from late antiquity, which might display the influence of Alexander, rather than drawing on Alexander directly. One source that has been suggested is Origen. 87 We also know, of course, that 83 
Conclusions
We have seen that Cudworth claims to be drawing on a Stoic doctrine of some things being 'up to us', and specifically our own choice being 'up to us', as ammunition against the Stoics' own doctrine of determinism.
Although he does not make it explicit, it seems that Cudworth's intention is to try to turn Stoics against Stoics. Such a strategy would come as no surprise to readers of the first part of The True Intellectual System, where Cudworth deliberately ranges different forms of atheism against one another, enabling him to claim that 'the kingdom of darkness [is] divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself'. 89 However, we have also seen that this claim does not stand up to close scrutiny. Our opening supposition that Epictetus might be standing behind Cudworth's use of these terms cannot be right. The definitions that Cudworth attaches to the terms that he claims belong to 'Stoical doctrine' do not correspond to what we find in Stoicism, either early or late. The sense in which Cudworth uses ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν involves the claim that what is 'up to us' includes the ability to choose other than we do, and yet this twosided potestative sense of the phrase never played a part in Stoicism.
Instead we must turn to Alexander to find this two-sided sense. Indeed, that Alexander might stand behind Cudworth's discussion seems highly appropriate given that Alexander's De fato might justly be described as the canonical ancient polemic against Stoic determinism. Despite appearances, then, Cudworth does not turn Stoics against Stoics or uncover a tension within Stoicism between determinism and voluntarism. The problem with which Cudworth is so concerned, whether we have the ability to act other than we do, did not yet exist for the Stoics. Cudworth is of course quite right to identify the Stoics qua determinists as a target for his polemics, but he must have turned elsewhere for the conceptual resources that he deploys in his fight against them.
